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Conroy and Yell: Free Appropriate Public Education

FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION AFTER
ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT (2017)
Terrye Conroy* & Mitchell L. Yell**
On March 22, 2017, Chief Justice John Roberts announced the
unanimous ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Endrew F. ex
rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1 (hereinafter
“Endrew”).1 More than thirty-five years earlier, on June 28, 1982,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist announced the High Court’s decision
in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District
v. Rowley (hereinafter “Rowley”).2 The decision in the Rowley case
was the first special education ruling by the Supreme Court. The
Endrew decision was the High Court’s most recent special education
ruling. Both cases involved the question of what constitutes a free
appropriate public education (hereinafter “FAPE”) as required by the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (hereinafter “IDEA”).3
The purpose of this article is to analyze the Supreme Court’s
decision in Endrew. In Part I we discuss the development of the FAPE
requirement of the IDEA. In Part II we analyze the Supreme Court’s
FAPE ruling in Rowley. Part III presents the split among the circuits
that made the Supreme Court’s granting of certiorari likely. In Part IV
we analyze the Supreme Court’s ruling in Endrew and the conclusion
of the case in the U.S. District Court. In Part V we present subsequent
lower court rulings that have applied the Endrew standard. We end, in
Part VI, by discussing implications of the Endrew decision.

* Terrye Conroy is the Assistant Director of Legal Research Instruction at the University of
South Carolina School of Law and a former disability lawyer.
** Mitchell Yell is the Fred and Francis Lester Palmetto Chair of Teacher Education and
Professor of Special Education at the University of South Carolina.
1 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
2 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
3 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2018).
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAPE

In the early 1970s, the Bureau for the Education of the
Handicapped in the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare provided data to subcommittees in the U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate that indicated that of more than 8
million children and youth with disabilities in the U.S. approximately
1.75 million, or over 21%, of these students were not receiving a public
education and another 2.5 million, or 31%, were not receiving an
education that was appropriate for their needs.4 Thus, over 50% of
children and youth with disabilities were either not allowed entry in
the public education system or when they were in the system, they
received an inappropriate education. According to Edwin Martin, a
former director of the Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped,
the children with disabilities who were in inappropriate public school
programs
were frequently subjected to substandard services in
poor facilities. Parents reported classes in basements,
janitor’s closets, condemned buildings and similar
sites. Children were often placed in classes
inappropriate for their needs, for example it was not
uncommon to find students with cerebral palsy, no
matter what their intelligence level, placed in classes
for children with mental retardation. Even when
programs were offered, they frequently were not staffed
by appropriately trained teachers, and instructors
generally had to create their own curricula and
materials. Supplies were limited or non-existent.5
In the early 1970s, parents of children with disabilities began
going to federal courts asserting that when public schools denied
enrollment or services to their children, the schools were denying their
children’s constitutional rights.6 In two seminal cases, Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania7
4 H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 11 (1975). See also S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975), as reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432.
5 EDWIN W. MARTIN, BREAKTHROUGH: FEDERAL SPECIAL EDUCATION LEGISLATION 19651981 loc. 321 (2013) (ebook).
6 REED MARTIN, EXTRAORDINARY CHILDREN ORDINARY LIVES: STORIES BEHIND SPECIAL
EDUCATION CASE LAW 1 (1991).
7 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/7

2

Conroy and Yell: Free Appropriate Public Education

2019

FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION

103

and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia,8 two U.S.
District Courts ruled that after having undertaken to provide an
education for all children, a state could not deny students with
disabilities access to free public education. These cases set a
precedent, which led to over 46 similar right to education cases being
filed in 28 states,9 and led to a flurry of activity in state legislatures
creating educational rights for students with disabilities.
Unfortunately, states’ efforts were very uneven, and many
representatives from the states as well as persons in the United States
government believed a federal role in the education of children and
youth with disabilities was needed to ensure that such students would
receive an appropriate education.10 In fact, Senator Harrison Williams,
the chief sponsor of legislation on the education of students with
disabilities, noted that “[i]t is time that Congress took strong and
forceful action. It is time for Congress to assure equal protection of
the laws and to provide to all handicapped children their right to
education.”11
An increased awareness of the poorly met needs of students
with disabilities, the judicial decisions finding constitutional
requirements for educating children and youth with disabilities in
public schools, and the inability of states to provide educational
opportunities for students with disabilities were among the most salient
factors12 that led to the enactment of the Education of All Handicapped
Children Act (hereinafter “EAHCA”) in 1975.13 The major purpose of
the law was to assist states to provide all eligible students with
disabilities14 an appropriate individualized educational program, which
8

348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3 (1975).
10 Id. at 11. See also S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8, as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1432.
11 121 CONG. REC. 19,485 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams).
12 NANCY LEE JONES, CONG. RES. SERV., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
ACT: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 1 (1995), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7997
/m1/1/high_res_d/95-669A_1995May19.pdf.
13 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(prior to 1990 amendment). In 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476 changed the name of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
frequently referred to as the IDEA. The law also eliminated the word “handicapped” and
substituted the word “disability.” The law’s name change emphasized people first language,
in which the person comes before the disability (e.g., child with a disability rather than a
disabled child).
14 For students with disabilities to be eligible for special education services under the IDEA
a team consisting of a student’s parents and school-based personnel must determine that a
9
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was referred to in the EAHCA as a FAPE.15 The EAHCA included a
set of procedural requirements to ensure that eligible students with
disabilities receive a FAPE.16 The procedural requirements, which
were enforceable in court, were intended to protect students with
disabilities from unilateral decisions by school personnel by ensuring
that parents were involved throughout the special education process.17
A FAPE consists of special education services that are
individually designed to meet a student with disabilities’ unique
educational needs. The IDEA defines a FAPE as special education and
related services that—
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary
school, or secondary school education in the State
involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program.18
According to the IDEA, a FAPE is delivered in conformity
with a student’s individualized education program (hereinafter
“IEP”).19 A student’s IEP is both a process in which his or her parents
and school-based personnel develop the student’s special education
program and the document in which the program is memorialized.20
Thus, an IEP, which the United States Supreme Court has described as
the “centerpiece”21 and “modus operandi”22 of the EAHCA, is the
student has one of more disabilities covered by the IDEA and that the student needs special
education services. The disabilities covered under the IDEA include: autism, deaf-blindness,
deafness, emotional disturbance, hearing impairment, intellectual disability, multiple
disabilities, orthopedic impairment, other health impairment, specific learning disability,
speech or language impairment, traumatic brain injury, visual impairment including blindness.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2018).
15 See id. § 1401(9).
16 See id. § 1415.
17 MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 223-26 (4th ed. 2016).
18 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
19 Id. § 1401(9)(D).
20 Mitchell L. Yell et al., The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Evolution of
Special Education Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 55-62 (James M. Kauffman et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2017).
21 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
22 Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 367-69
(1985).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/7

4

Conroy and Yell: Free Appropriate Public Education

2019

FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION

105

blueprint of a student’s FAPE.23 Because the statutory definition does
not set forth any particular level of educational benefit that a student
must achieve to be provided a FAPE, its meaning has been subject to
dispute.24 Many of these disputes were settled in due process hearings
and in formal litigation. Typically, these disputes involved questions
about what degree of educational benefit a FAPE should provide. In
1982, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the EAHCA’s
FAPE mandate in Rowley.25
II.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE HENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. ROWLEY (1982)

Amy Rowley was a young child with a severe hearing
impairment. She attended Furnace Woods Elementary School in the
Hendrick Hudson Central School District in Peekskill, New York.26
During the year that Amy began attending Furnace Woods, she was
placed in a regular kindergarten class. Because Amy was eligible for
services under the EAHCA, she was entitled to receive a FAPE. An
IEP was developed for her during the fall of her first-grade year;
however, it did not include a sign language interpreter, as requested by
Amy’s parents.27 School personnel agreed to a three-week test period
with an interpreter. After the test period, the district decided not to
provide the services of an interpreter to Amy.28 The parents requested
a due process hearing and then a state review. Amy’s parents lost at
both administrative levels and appealed the case to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, which overturned the
administrative decisions and ruled in favor of Amy, ruling that the
school district had failed to provide Amy with a FAPE, thus violating
the EAHCA.29 The court concluded that Amy was performing better
than many children in her class and was passing from grade to grade;
23

Mitchell L. Yell et al., Special Education Law for Leaders and Administrators of Special
Education, in HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION 95
(Jean B. Crockett et al. eds., 2012).
24 DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER ET AL., NAVIGATING SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY 176
(2012).
25 See generally Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982).
26 Id. at 184.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 185.
29 Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
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however, “she understands considerably less of what goes on in class
than she could if she were not deaf.”30 Additionally, Amy was “not
learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she would
without her handicap.”31 The school district’s special education
program, therefore, should have provided Amy with “an opportunity
to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity
provided to other children.”32
The school district filed an appeal and a divided panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s
ruling that the school district had failed to provide Amy with a FAPE.33
The school district then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari in November 1981.34 The High Court
addressed two questions: “What is meant by the [EAHCA’s]
requirement of a ‘free appropriate public education’? And what is the
role of state and federal courts in exercising the review granted by [the
EAHCA]?”35
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the 6 to
3 majority.36 In the ruling, which was issued on June 28, 1982, the
Supreme Court held that the school district had provided a FAPE.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote “we hold that [the school district]
satisfies [the FAPE] requirement by providing personalized instruction
with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit
educationally from that instruction.”37
He further wrote “if
personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive
services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction . . . the child
is receiving a ‘free appropriate public education’ as defined by the
Act.”38 Thus, the Court rejected the lower court’s requirement that to
confer a FAPE, school districts had to provide an education that
allowed a student an equal opportunity to achieve to his or her
maximum potential. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in the majority
opinion:
30

Id. at 532.
Id.
32 Id. at 534.
33 Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 632 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir.
1980).
34 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 454 U.S. 961 (1981).
35 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982).
36 Id. at 179.
37 Id. at 203.
38 Id. at 189.
31
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The requirement that States provide “equal”
educational opportunities would thus seem to present
an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible
measurements and comparisons. . . . [T]o require, on
the other hand, the furnishing of every special service
necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s
potential is, we think, further than Congress intended to
go.39
The Court developed a two-part test for courts to use when
ruling on FAPE. “First, has the [school] complied with the procedures
of the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program
developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits?”40 According to the
Court, if these requirements were met, a school had complied with the
FAPE requirements.41
In the years following the Rowley decision, lower courts used
the two-part Rowley test to decide FAPE cases. The procedural part of
the test, part 1, seemed to be relatively straightforward, however, the
educational benefit part of the test, part 2, proved to be a more difficult
determination for courts.
III.

THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS

During this period, various U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
began to apply different standards in deciding what amount of
educational benefits was necessary for a school district to have
conferred a FAPE. The U.S. Solicitor General referred to this split
among the courts as “[a]n [e]ntrenched [a]nd [a]cknowledged [c]ircuit
[c]onflict.”42 Although all the circuit courts had agreed with the overall
Rowley standard that an IEP must be “reasonably calculated to provide
educational benefits,”43 the difference among the courts was on the
amount of educational benefit that would satisfy the Supreme Court’s
FAPE requirement. At least six circuits, the Second, Fourth, Seventh,
39

Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 206-07 (footnote omitted).
41 Id. at 207.
42 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas
Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/15-827-US-Amicus.pdf.
43 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
40
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Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh,44 had adopted some variation of a some
or de minimis degree of educational benefit as being sufficient to
confer a FAPE, a very low educational benefit standard that only
required that the educational benefit provided by a school district be
“just barely more than trivial.”45 Two other circuits, the Third and the
Sixth, adopted a meaningful benefit standard, which was higher than
the some or de minimis standard.46 In fact, the Third and Sixth Circuits
affirmatively rejected the de minimis standard as insufficient to satisfy
the FAPE requirement.47 The First and Fifth Circuits held that the
FAPE standards required more than simply a trivial or de minimis
educational benefit while noting that access had to be meaningful,
nonetheless, it seemed that in rulings neither circuit court required
much more than the lower standard to satisfy the FAPE requirement.48
The Ninth Circuit was divided with the panels disagreeing with each
other over the correct educational benefit standard.49
This split made it more likely that the Supreme Court would
eventually hear another FAPE case to interpret the educational benefit
standard set in Rowley. This opportunity presented itself in an appeal
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Endrew F. ex rel.
Joseph F. v Douglas County School District in 2015.50 In this case, the
Tenth Circuit had used the educational benefit standard of “merely . .
. more than de minimis”51 as being sufficient to confer a FAPE.
The case involved Endrew, a student in the fourth grade in the
Douglas County School District in Colorado. Endrew had autism and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and had an IEP throughout his
early school years.52 His parents, alleging that Endrew had failed to
progress academically or functionally in the fourth grade, rejected
Endrew’s IEP and placed him in a private school, the Firefly Autism
House.53 Endrew’s parents noticed a dramatic difference in his
behavior and achievement while he was in the private school
44

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
46 Mitchell L. Yell & David F. Bateman, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District
(2017): FAPE and the U.S. Supreme Court, 50 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 7 (2017).
47 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 10.
48
Id. at 10 n.4.
49 Id.
50 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015).
51 Id. at 1338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
52 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 996 (2017).
53 Id.
45
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placement.54 Nonetheless, they wanted their son to be educated in a
public school so they approached the Douglas County School District
about re-enrolling Endrew in their home school and developing a new
IEP based on his successful programming at the Firefly Autism
House.55 Unfortunately, Endrew’s parents believed the IEP was not an
improvement over the previous IEP they had rejected. Endrew’s
parents continued his placement at the Firefly Autism House and filed
for a due process hearing in which they argued that the Douglas County
School District had failed to provide him with a FAPE for which they
sought tuition reimbursement for his private school placement .56 The
due process hearing officer and federal district court found that the
Douglas County School District had provided a FAPE and denied
Endrew’s parents tuition reimbursement. The parents then appealed to
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.57 The Tenth
Circuit court found that the school district had met the “merely . . .
more than de minimis” educational benefit test thus ruling that the
school district provided Endrew with a FAPE.58 Although the Tenth
Circuit court acknowledged that the meaningful educational benefit
test was a higher standard that promised students with disabilities
greater achievement than did the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis test,59 the
court ruled:
We find sufficient support in the record to affirm the
findings of the administrative law judge that the child
received some educational benefit while in the
District’s care and that is enough to satisfy the District’s
obligation to provide a free appropriate public
education. . . .60
This is without question a close case, but we
find there are sufficient indications of Drew’s past

54

Id. at 997.
Ann Schimke, Inside One Colorado Family’s Long Legal Journey to Affirm Their Son’s
Right to a Meaningful Education, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.chalkbeat.org/pos
ts/co/2017/11/15/inside-one-colorado-familys-long-legal-journey-to-affirm-their-sons-rightto-a-meaningful-education/.
56 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 11-12.
60 Endrew F., 798 F.3d at 1332.
55
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progress to find the IEP rejected by the parents
substantively adequate under our prevailing standard.61
Following the circuit court decision, the parents appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. The question presented to the Court was what
is the level of educational benefit school districts must confer on
children with disabilities to provide them with a FAPE guaranteed by
the IDEA? The parents argued that the Douglas County School
District had failed to provide Endrew with a FAPE in accordance with
the Rowley two-part FAPE test because the IEP was not reasonably
calculated to provide him with educational benefit.
On May 31, 2016, the U.S. Solicitor General was invited to file
a brief in the case expressing the views of the United States. On
August 8, 2016, the Solicitor General’s amicus curiae brief was filed.
In the twenty-one- page brief, the Solicitor General wrote:
[T]he split of authority on the question presented is real,
and only this Court can resolve it. There is no
justification for providing children with disabilities
different degrees of protection under federal law
depending on where they happen to live. This Court
should clarify the proper FAPE analysis and establish a
uniform standard to guide courts, state educational
agencies, and parents across the county.62
On September 29, 2016, the High Court granted the petition for
certiorari.63 The question Endrew’s parents asked the Supreme Court
to answer was the following: “What is the level of educational benefit
school districts must confer on children with disabilities to provide
them with the free appropriate public education guaranteed by the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400 et
seq.?”64

61

Id. at 1342.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 13.
63 See generally Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 29
(2016).
64 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist.
RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 29 (2016) (No. 15-827), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/201
6/05/15-827-Petition-for-Certiorari.pdf.
62
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ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1
(2017)

In January 2017, the Court heard oral arguments in Endrew.
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court issued its opinion vacating the
decision and remanding the case back to the Tenth Circuit. Chief
Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for a unanimous65 Supreme Court.
In his opinion Justice Roberts began with a statement acknowledging
that the Court’s purpose in hearing the Endrew case was to bring clarity
to the second prong of the Rowley tests when he wrote:
Thirty-five years ago, this Court held that the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act establishes
a substantive right to a “free appropriate public
education” for certain children with disabilities. We
declined, however, to endorse any one standard for
determining “when handicapped children are receiving
sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the
requirements of the Act.” That “more difficult
problem” is before us today.66
Justice Roberts referred to the IEP as a “fact-intensive
exercise”67 in which school personnel and a student’s parents
collaborate to develop and implement a special education program.
The focus of the IEP is on the unique needs of an individual student
and is developed only after careful consideration of the student’s
present levels of academic achievement and functional performance,
his or her disability, and the student’s “potential for growth.”68 The
Court noted that it is through the IEP that a FAPE is tailored to meet
the unique needs of an individual student.69 Justice Roberts wrote that
“[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress. After all,
the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing
academic and functional advancement.”70
The Court announced a new standard of educational benefit:
“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must
65

Because a justice had not been confirmed to the open seat previously occupied by Justice
Antonin Scalia, there were only eight justices sitting on the Endrew case.
66 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993 (citations omitted).
67 Id. at 999.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1000.
70 Id. at 999.
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offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”71 With respect to the
new standard, Justice Roberts wrote:
[T]his standard is markedly more demanding than the
“merely more than de minimis” test applied by the
Tenth Circuit. . . . [and that] a student offered an
educational program providing “merely more than de
minimis” progress from year to year can hardly be said
to have been offered an education at all.72
Although the Supreme Court justices rejected the lower de
minimis standard, the Court did not embrace the higher standard
requested by Endrew’s parents. Endrew’s parents had asserted that the
IDEA requires that school districts provide students with disabilities
an education that is substantially equal to those opportunities provided
to students without disabilities.73 Justice Roberts cited the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Rowley as rejecting the notion of equal opportunity
because of unworkable standards, measurement, and comparisons that
would be required. Thus, the Court declined to interpret FAPE in a
manner that was at odds with the Rowley decision.
Nonetheless, the Endrew educational benefit standard is clearly
higher than the standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit court. In fact,
Justice Roberts wrote that “[a] substantive standard not focused on
student progress would do little to remedy the pervasive and tragic
academic stagnation that prompted Congress to act.”74 It is also clear
from the language in Endrew that the Court raised the educational
benefit standard for all students with disabilities.75
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Tenth
Circuit court to reconsider its ruling in light of the new higher standard
for educational benefit.76 On August 2, 2017, the Tenth Circuit court
remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of

71

Id.
Id. at 1000-01.
73
Brief for Petitioner at 40, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1,
137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
15-827-petitioner-merits-brief.pdf.
74 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
75 Julie Waterstone, Endrew F.: Symbolism v. Reality, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 527, 527-28 (2017).
76 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1002.
72
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Colorado, the first court to rule on Endrew, to reconsider its ruling in
light of the Supreme Court’s higher educational benefit standard.77
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado issued its
decision in the remand of Endrew on February 12, 2018.78 Judge
Lewis Babcock reversed his original decision in favor of the Douglas
County School District and ruled in favor of Endrew and his parents.79
According to the judge, the Douglas County School District had failed
to provide a FAPE to Endrew in light of the Supreme Court’s higher
educational benefit standard.80 Judge Babcock ordered the Douglas
County School District to reimburse Endrew’s tuition and related
expenses that were incurred when they removed Endrew from the
Douglas County School District and placed him in a private school, the
Firefly Autism House, at their own expense.81 The judge also ordered
the Douglas County School District to pay Endrew’s parents’ court
costs and attorneys’ fees, which amounted to $1.3 million dollars.82
V.

POST ENDREW FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS

For this article we used the Westlaw Citing References and
KeyCite Alert tools to track and chart all federal court decisions that
have addressed the new FAPE standard from the date of the Endrew
decision (March 22, 2017) through July 15, 2018. We excluded
opinions that simply cited Endrew without any discussion of the new
FAPE standard as well as decisions dealing with non-FAPE issues,
e.g., exhausting administrative remedies. The final chart appended at
the end of this article is organized by federal circuits.83 The first entry
is the citation and FAPE educational benefits standard applied in the
latest pre-Endrew Court of Appeals case for that circuit. Next, we
included the most recent post-Endrew Court of Appeals decision, if
any, followed by other court of appeals and district court decisions
77 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 694 F. App’x 654, 655 (10th
Cir. 2017).
78 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1175
(D. Colo. 2018).
79 Id. at 1185-86.
80
Id.
81 Id. at 1186.
82 Ann Schimke, Douglas County District Pays $1.3 Million to Settle Landmark Special
Education Case, DENV. POST (June 20, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/06
/20/douglas-county-district-special-education-case/.
83 See infra Appendix A.
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addressing Endrew’s new substantive FAPE standard in reverse
chronological order.
For each post-Endrew opinion in the chart, we included the
procedural history, disposition, and the exact language used by that
court in its analysis/application of the new Endrew standard. We
included opinions that discussed the new standard, even if the court
remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Endrew
decision. We also included language used by the court to compare its
circuit’s prior or current substantive FAPE standard to the new Endrew
standard. Lastly, we included published and “not selected for
publication” decisions in the chart. Rule 32.1(a) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure allows for the citation of judicial opinions,
orders, and judgments issued on or after January 1, 2007 that have been
designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” or “nonprecedential.”84 Furthermore, the precedential value of a specific
federal court decision does not affect the outcome in that particular
child’s case.
Our purpose for creating this chart was not to compare the
outcomes of pre- and post-Endrew FAPE decisions, but to explore how
federal courts are interpreting the new substantive FAPE standard and
how a court might compare the language used in Endrew to the
language used pre- or post-Endrew in its Circuit.
After we address the language used by each Circuit in its
analysis of the new substantive FAPE standard, we share our
observations from our review of these cases. In Part VI, we end by
discussing implications of the Endrew decision.
A.

Post Endrew Decisions by Circuit

As stated earlier, part-two of the Rowley FAPE test asks: “is
the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s
procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits?”85 However, the Court in Rowley cautioned:
“We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the
adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered
by the Act.”86 Without further guidance from the Supreme Court,
federal courts across the circuits proceeded to use adjectives ranging
84
85
86

FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a).
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
Id. at 202.
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from “some” to “meaningful” to quantify the educational benefits
required for a FAPE.87 In 2017 the Supreme Court in Endrew
pronounced its new substantive FAPE standard:
While Rowley declined to articulate an
overarching standard to evaluate the adequacy of the
education provided under the Act, the decision and the
statutory language point to a general approach: To meet
its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school
must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a
child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.88
Although the Supreme Court explained that this new standard “is
markedly more demanding than the ‘merely more than de minimis’ test
applied by the Tenth Circuit,”89 it again declined to establish a “brightline rule.”90 Therefore, courts are now tasked with determining what
effect, if any, this new substantive FAPE standard has on how it
describes and measures the educational benefit or progress required to
satisfy this new FAPE test.
1.

First Circuit

In 2012, in D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals began by stating that the IDEA requires
“more than a trivial educational benefit,” but concluded “to comply
with the IDEA, an IEP must be reasonably calculated to confer a
meaningful educational benefit.”91 As supporting authority, the court
cited the 2010 Third Circuit opinion in D.S. v. Bayonne Board of
Education.92 With its Elizabeth B. decision, the First Circuit joined the
Third and Sixth Circuits, which had been the only circuits to apply the
meaningful educational benefit standard.93 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals has not decided a post-Endrew substantive FAPE case.
87

See generally Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of
How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 EDUC. LAW REP. 1 (2009); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 8-12.
88 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998-99
(2017).
89 Id. at 1000.
90 Id. at 1001.
91 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012).
92 Id. (citing 602 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 2010)).
93 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 9, 11.
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However, in July 2017 in C.D. ex rel. M.D. v. Natick Public School
District, a District of Massachusetts court stated that the Endrew
standard was “not materially different from the standard set” by the
First Circuit in Elizabeth B. and that the educational benefit described
in Endrew as “‘appropriate’ educational progress” was consistent with
its “meaningful educational benefit” standard.94 The C.D. court cited
a “meaningful benefit” case from a district court in the Third Circuit.95
2.

Second Circuit

In 1998, the court in Walczak v. Florida Union Free School
District set the substantive FAPE standard for the Second Circuit as
more than “trivial advancement,” and “likely to produce progress, not
regression.”96 Post-Endrew, in Mr. P. v. West Hartford Board of
Education, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s judgment for the school district because it “provided M.P. with
a meaningful educational program that was reasonably calculated to
enable M.P. to make progress appropriate in light of his
circumstances.”97 Interestingly, however, citing the pre-Endrew
Walczak decision, the court in Mr. P. also stated that its prior decisions
applying the “likely to produce progress, not regression” standard,
were consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew.98 Most
of the post-Endrew district court opinions from the Second Circuit
simply apply the Endrew standard of “reasonably calculated to enable
a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances”99 without addressing the level of educational benefit or
progress required for a FAPE. Some appear to continue to apply the
“likely to produce progress, not regression” standard.100

94

No. 15-13617-FDS, 2017 WL 3122654, at *16 (D. Mass. July 21, 2017).
Id. (citing Brandywine Heights Area Sch. Dist. v. B.M., 248 F. Supp. 3d 618, 632 n.25
(E.D. Pa. 2017)).
96 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998).
97 885 F.3d 735, 757 (2d Cir. 2018).
98 Id.
99 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998-99
(2017).
100 See, e.g., MB v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, No. 17-CV-1273 (KBF), 2018 WL
1609266, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018); F.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Great Neck U.F.S.D., 274
F. Supp. 3d 94, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Avaras v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 15 Civ. 2042
(NSR), 2017 WL 3037402, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017).
95
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Third Circuit

In Ridley School District v. M.R., a 2012 pre-Endrew decision,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[a]lthough a state is
not required to maximize the potential of every handicapped child, it
must supply an education that provides ‘significant learning’ and
‘meaningful benefit’ to the child.”101 The Third Circuit has not decided
a post-Endrew substantive FAPE case; however, the post-Endrew
district court opinions from the Third Circuit continue to require a
meaningful educational benefit. In July of 2018, in Jack J. ex rel.
Jennifer S. v. Coatesville Area School District, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania upheld the standard applied by the hearing officer who
concluded that “[t]he IEP must be ‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the
child to receive appropriate services in light of the child’s individual
circumstances” and “services are appropriate when they are reasonably
calculated to provide a child with ‘meaningful educational
benefits.’”102 Other district courts in the Third Circuit have noted that
the Third Circuit’s meaningful benefit standard is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s Endrew decision.103
Some, however, have
substituted “in light of the student’s intellectual potential” for “in light
of the child’s circumstances.”104
4.

Fourth Circuit

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in its 2012 O.S. ex
rel. Michael S. v. Fairfax County School Board opinion made it clear
that absent an “express acknowledgment” from Congress of its intent
to abrogate Supreme Court precedent, that the Fourth Circuit, like the
Tenth Circuit in Endrew, applied a “some” not a “meaningful” benefit
standard, meaning a benefit that is “more than minimal or trivial.”105
Although the Fourth Circuit has not decided a post-Endrew substantive
101

680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
No. 17-CV-3793, 2018 WL 3397552, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2018) (alteration in
original).
103 Sean C. ex rel. Helen C. v. Oxford Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-5286, 2017 WL 3485880,
at *9 n.13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2017).
104 See, e.g., Montgomery Cty. Intermediate Unit No. 23 v. C.M., No. 17-1523, 2017 WL
4548022, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2017); Benjamin A. ex rel. Michael v. Unionville-Chadds
Ford Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-2545, 2017 WL 3482089, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2017); L.M. v.
Willingboro Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-3672, 2017 WL 2539388, at *6 (D.N.J. June 12,
2017).
105 804 F.3d 354, 359-60 (4th Cir. 2015).
102
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FAPE case, in M.L. ex rel. Leiman v. Smith, the court acknowledged
that its “some” benefit standard had been “overturned” by the Supreme
Court in Endrew.106 However, the court declined to address the effects
of Endrew on its precedent because the remedy sought by M.L.’s
parents, to provide religious instruction, was not available under the
IDEA.107 A few months later, in N.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Maxwell, the
Fourth Circuit again recognized the new substantive FAPE standard in
Endrew, noting that the ALJ quoted the “more than de minimis”
standard in her pre-Endrew opinion, which the Supreme Court
“invalidated” in Endrew.108 Stressing the importance of deference,109
the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to allow the ALJ to decide “whether the outcome of the
case is different under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Endrew.”110
The district courts in the Fourth Circuit have also not actually
addressed the educational benefit or progress required under the new
substantive FAPE standard. In Sauers v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth
County Board of Education, the Middle District of North Carolina
court stated that the “Fourth Circuit’s FAPE standard has come into
question” after Endrew, remanded the case back to the state after
questioning the standard applied by the ALJ and the SRO, who
“referred to ‘educational benefits’ but did not expound upon exactly
where on the spectrum said benefits were deemed adequate.”111
However, in J.R v. Smith, after acknowledging the “now-invalid
Fourth Circuit standard from O.S.,” a Maryland District Court declined
to remand because in her pre-Endrew decision the ALJ “went beyond
the ‘more than de minimus [sic]’ standard from O.S. and laid out an
approach that evaluated what progress was appropriate in light of the
child’s circumstances, just as Endrew F. requires.”112

106
107
108
109
110
111
112

867 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 499.
711 F. App’x 713, 719 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 716-17.
Id. at 719.
No. 1:15CV427, 2018 WL 1621516, at *12 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2018).
No. DKC 16-1633, 2017 WL 3592453, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2017).
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Fifth Circuit

In 2016, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rockwall
Independent School District v. M.C. described its circuit’s substantive
FAPE standard as “likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial
educational advancement” while noting that “the educational benefit
that an IEP is designed to achieve must be ‘meaningful.’”113 However,
in his amicus brief for the United States in Endrew, the U.S. Solicitor
General questioned whether the Fifth Circuit would actually require
more than a “trivial benefit” for a school district to have provided a
FAPE.114
Post-Endrew, on July 27, 2017, in Dallas Independent School
District v. Woody, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decisions of both the hearing officer and the district court for the
Northern District of Texas that the school district had denied a
FAPE.115 In that case, the Fifth Circuit, citing Endrew, simply stated
that the school district “was obligated to ‘offer an IEP reasonably
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child’s circumstances.’”116 However in a footnote the court stated that
to provide a FAPE a child must “receive a meaningful educational
benefit.”117
A month before, in C.G. ex rel. Keith G. v. Waller Independent
School District, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas had applied a standard
consistent with the Endrew decision.118 The district court had rejected
the de minimis benefit standard for one that is “likely to produce
progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement”119 and
concluded that the C.G.’s IEP had been “reasonabl[y] based on her
specific needs and progress.”120 The Fifth Circuit ruled that
“[a]lthough the district court did not articulate the standard set forth in
113

816 F.3d 329, 338 (5th Cir. 2016).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 10 n.4. It is not clear,
however, whether those circuits would hold that the provision of anything beyond a trivial
benefit necessarily means that the education provided is “meaningful” and thus satisfies the
FAPE standard.
115 865 F.3d 303, 317 (5th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that the school district failed to make a
timely offer of FAPE).
116 Id. at 317.
117 Id. at 322 n.8.
118 697 F. App’x 816 (5th Cir. 2017).
119 Id. at 819.
120 Id.
114
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Endrew F. verbatim, its analysis of C.G.’s IEP is fully consistent with
that standard and leaves no doubt that the court was convinced that
C.G.’s IEP was ‘appropriately ambitious in light of [her]
circumstances.’”121
A week before the Fifth Circuit’s decision in C.G., a U.S.
Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Texas also rejected the de
minimis benefit standard for one “likely to produce progress, not
regression or trivial educational advancement.”122 In E.R. ex rel. S.R.
v. Spring Branch Independent School District,123 Judge Milloy
articulated the court’s post-Endrew standard as: “[T]he educational
benefit that an IEP is designed to achieve must be ‘meaningful’ and
‘appropriately ambitious in light of the student’s circumstances.’”124
6.

Sixth Circuit

In 2004, in Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Third Circuit to require a
“meaningful educational benefit”125 stating “we agree that the IDEA
requires an IEP to confer a ‘meaningful educational benefit’ gauged in
relation to the potential of the child at issue.”126 The Sixth Circuit has
not decided a post-Endrew substantive FAPE case; however, the
standard articulated in the post-Endrew district court decisions from
the Sixth Circuit appears to focus on the unique needs, circumstances,
or potential of the child without addressing an appropriate measure of
educational benefit or progress. In D.L. v. St. Louis City Public School
District, the court for the Eastern District of Missouri, noting that the
IEP “must be responsive to the student’s specific disabilities, whether
academic or behavioral,”127 held that the responsibility of the district
was to provide services “tailored to the unique needs of a particular
child.”128 In Barney v. Akron Board of Education, the district court for
the Northern District of Ohio, stating that the Supreme Court in
121

Id.
E.R. ex rel. S.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:16-CV-0058, 2017 WL
3017282, at *13 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2017).
123 Id.
124
Id. (citing Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988,
1001 (2017)).
125 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004).
126 Id. at 862.
127 326 F. Supp. 3d 810, 824 (E.D. Mo. 2018).
128 Id. (citing Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994).
122
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Endrew required an IEP to be “judged as appropriate based on the
individual child’s potential,” described an IEP providing a FAPE as
one that is “appropriately ambitious in light of [the child’s]
circumstances.”129 Lastly, focusing on the child’s circumstances, the
Eastern District of Tennessee in I.L. ex rel. Taylor v. Knox County
Board. of Education ruled that although the school district refused to
implement 13 of I.L.’s goals when her mother rejected an offer for
additional special education services, I.L. was not denied a FAPE.130
7.

Seventh Circuit

In its 2011 M.B. ex rel. Berns v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools
opinion, the Seventh Circuit, citing the Second and the Fifth, stated:
“We reiterate that an IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child
to receive an educational benefit ‘when it is “likely to produce
progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement.”’”131 As
of July 15, 2018, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had not decided
a post-Endrew FAPE educational benefits case, nor had any district
court in the Seventh Circuit.
8.

Eighth Circuit

In 2011, in K.E. ex rel. K.E. v. Independent School District No.
15, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Rowley, applied the
“some educational benefit” standard to determine whether a child was
provided a FAPE.132 Post-Endrew, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has not addressed the level of educational benefit or progress required
for a FAPE. In its I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public
Schools opinion, the Eighth Circuit simply cited Endrew for a FAPE
requiring “progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances”
and for the IDEA not requiring a particular outcome, i.e., braille
sufficiency.133
The district courts in the Eighth Circuit have also applied the
Endrew’s “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in

129

No. 5:16CV0112, 2017 WL 4226875, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2017) (citing Endrew
F., 137 S. Ct. at 999).
130 257 F. Supp. 3d 946, 981, 995 (E.D. Tenn. 2017).
131 668 F.3d 851, 862 (7th Cir. 2011).
132 647 F.3d 795, 809 (8th Cir. 2011).
133 863 F.3d 966, 971 (8th Cir. 2017).
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light of the child’s circumstances”134 standard without addressing the
level of educational benefit or progress required for a FAPE.135 In
Paris School District v. A.H. ex rel. Harter, the court for the Western
District of Arkansas acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Endrew
had rejected the Eighth Circuit’s “merely more than de minimis”
standard.136 Recognizing that the hearing officer, pre-Endrew, had
cited to circuits requiring a higher standard, the court stated that it
would apply the Endrew standard.137 In doing so, the district court
affirmed the hearing officer’s finding that the school district had
denied A.H. a FAPE, but did not mention the level of educational
benefit or progress required, except to note that the Court in Endrew
described it as “markedly more demanding.”138
9.

Ninth Circuit

In his amicus brief for the United States in Endrew, the U.S.
Solicitor General noted that different panels of the Ninth Circuit had
disagreed over the correct FAPE educational benefits standard.139 In
its 2010 J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified School District decision,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described the appropriate benefit
for a FAPE as “meaningful.”140 Post-Endrew, the Ninth Circuit
decision in E.F. v. Newport Mesa Unified School District was
remanded by the Supreme Court “for further consideration in light of”
its Endrew decision.141 On remand, citing its other 2010 J.L. v. Mercer
Island School District decision,142 the Ninth Circuit court found that
the standard applied by the ALJ in E.F. was “proper even before
Endrew clarified the Supreme Court’s holding in Rowley.”143
However, in a footnote in the 2010 J.L decision, the Ninth Circuit

134 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998-99
(2017).
135 See, e.g., Denny v. Bertha-Hewit Pub. Schs., No. 16-cv-1954, 2017 WL 4355968, at *20
(D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2017); Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-CV-3011, 2017
WL 2880853, at *4 (W.D. Ark. July 5, 2017).
136 No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2017).
137 Id. at *5.
138
Id.
139 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 42, at 10 n.4.
140 626 F.3d 431, 432-33 (9th Cir. 2010).
141 726 F. App’x 535, 536 (9th Cir. 2018).
142 592 F.3d 938, 951 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010).
143 E.F., 726 F. App’x at 537.
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acknowledged the confusion in its circuit.144 Nevertheless, in its
unreported opinion in E.F., the Ninth Circuit appears to state the
substantive FAPE standard as “‘reasonably calculated to enable [E.F.]
to receive educational benefits’ and make appropriate progress in light
of the circumstances.”145 The district courts in the Ninth Circuit have
largely applied the Endrew substantive FAPE standard without
elaborating on the measure of educational benefit or progress required
for a FAPE. Some have used the terms “appropriately ambitious” and
“challenging objectives” from Endrew.146 In Unknown Party v.
Gilbert Unified School District, the court for the District of Arizona
used the term “meaningful benefit” when it held that although the
parents were satisfied with “some progress,” the school district could
unilaterally change schools to provide more for their son.147 The court
reasoned that a “[s]tudent’s circumstances do not require lowering the
properly-calibrated IEP goals for his progress.”148
10.

Tenth Circuit

Endrew was a Tenth Circuit case.149 The Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and
“remanded for further proceedings consistent” with its opinion.150 The
Tenth Circuit court in Endrew had applied the “more than de minimis”
standard from its opinion in Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke P
ex rel. Jeff P.151 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit
144

J.L., 592 F.3d at 952 n.10. Some confusion exists in this circuit regarding whether the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires school districts to provide disabled
students with “educational benefit,” “some educational benefit” or a “meaningful” educational
benefit. See, e.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (2008). As
we read the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley, all three phrases refer to the same standard.
School districts must, to “make such access meaningful,” confer at least “some educational
benefit” on disabled students. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 172, 202. For ease of discussion, we refer to this standard as the
“educational benefit” standard.
145 E.F., 726 F. App’x at 537 (alteration in original).
146 See, e.g., Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist. v. D.W., 271 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1154 (N.D.
Cal. 2017); K.M. ex rel. Markham v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:15-cv-001835, 2017
WL 1348807, *17 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2017); N.G. ex rel. Green v. Tehachapi Unified Sch.
Dist., No. 1:15-cv-01740-LJO-JLT, 2017 WL 1354687, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017).
147
No. CV-16-02614-PHX-JJT, 2017 WL 3225189, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2017).
148 Id.
149 See generally Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d
1329 (10th Cir. 2015).
150 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1002 (2017).
151 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008).
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vacated its prior decision and remanded to the District of Colorado to
address the Supreme Court’s ruling.152 Judge Babcock, applying the
Supreme Court’s new substantive FAPE standard, reversed his earlier
decision concluding that:
Petitioner and his parent have met their burden to prove
that the District’s April 2010 IEP failed to create an
educational plan that was reasonably calculated to
enable Petitioner to make progress, even in light of his
unique circumstances. The IEP was not appropriately
ambitious because it did not give Petitioner the chance
to meet challenging objectives under his particular
circumstances.153
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided a postEndrew FAPE educational benefits case and there have been only a
few district court decisions to address the substantive FAPE standard.
There were two District of Colorado Smith v. Cheyenne Mountain
School District decisions that appear to involve the same child who
was represented by his mother pro se. In the May 11, 2017 decision,
the court noted that the ALJ’s decision preceded the reversal of the
Tenth Circuit’s “simply more than de minimis” standard, but that
remand was not necessary because the ALJ found that “M.S. had
progressed.”154 The district court concluded that the evidence showed
“M.S. made progress in the general education program that was
appropriate to his circumstances.”155 In the second Smith decision, the
court also appears to have applied the Endrew FAPE standard without
addressing the measure of educational benefit or progress required for
a FAPE.156
The court for the District of New Mexico combined the words
“some” and “meaningful” and “progress” in its Board of Education of
Albuquerque Public Schools v. Maez decision when it found that
“M.M. made some meaningful progress relative to the severity of his
disabilities and the IEP was reasonably calculated to enable M.M. to
152 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 694 F. App’x 654, 655
(10th Cir. 2017).
153
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE 1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 118586 (D. Colo. 2018).
154 No. 15-00881-PAB-CBS, 2017 WL 2791415, at *7 n.11 (D. Colo. May 11, 2017).
155 Id.
156 Smith v. Cheyenne Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 14-CV-03390-PAB-KHR, 2018 WL
1203172, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2018).
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progress in light of his combination of disabilities.”157 The court
concluded: “Thus, in light of these unique circumstances, the Court
finds M.M. was making some meaningful progress.”158
11.

Eleventh Circuit

In 2001, in Devine v. Indian River County School Board, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated emphatically that under the
IDEA and Rowley a child was “only entitled to some educational
benefit.”159 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided a
post-Endrew substantive FAPE case.
Of the few district court decisions from the Eleventh Circuit to
address the new Endrew FAPE standard, one is from the Northern
District of Alabama and the other from the Middle District of Florida.
In Rosaria M. v. Madison City Board of Education, the Northern
District of Alabama court described the Supreme Court’s Endrew
decision, as in Rowley, as charting a “middle course,” requiring the
court to determine “whether F.M.’s IEP was designed to challenge her
and ‘to enable her to make progress appropriate in light of [her]
circumstances.’”160 The S.M. v. Hendry County School Board case
from the Middle District of Florida began with a U.S. Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that the district court affirm the ALJ’s
decision in favor of the school district.161 In Judge Mirando’s Report
and Recommendation, she stressed that the IEP must be “reasonable,”
which depends on the child’s “unique needs,” and that the program
“must be appropriately ambitious” and include “challenging
objectives.”162 The Magistrate Judge found that L.C’s “IEP was
reasonably calculated to enable L.C to receive an educational benefit
that would allow him to make appropriate progress in light of his
unique circumstances.”163 The district court accepted Judge Mirando’s
recommendation.164 In doing so the court reasoned that although the
ALJ’s decision was three years before Endrew and applied the “more
than trivial or de minimis progress” standard, that Judge Mirando
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

No. 16-cv-1082 WJ/WPL, 2017 WL 3278945, at *5 (D.N.M. Aug 1, 2017).
Id. at *13.
249 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001).
325 F.R.D. 429, 447 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
No. 2:14-CV-237-FTM-38CM, 2017 WL 9360881, at *21 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2017).
Id. at *14.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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evaluated the case under the new standard and properly determined the
ALJ’s findings were still entitled to “great deference.”165
12.

D.C. Circuit

In 2015, in Leggett v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals maintained its “some [educational] benefit” standard
for a child to receive a FAPE.166 Post-Endrew, the D.C. Circuit
remanded the 2018 Z.B. v. District of Columbia case for “further
consideration” of the adequacy of Z.B.’s IEP under the new Endrew
standard167 because it appeared “more demanding” than the standard
applied by the district court.168 Citing Endrew, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals advised the district court below that the Supreme Court
stressed “challenging objectives” that are “appropriately ambitious in
light of his circumstances”169 and that the “key inquiry” was whether
the IEP “offered was reasonably calculated to enable the specific
student’s progress.”170
A month later, the D.C. district court in Middleton v. District
of Columbia, quoting the D.C. Court of Appeals in Z.B. v. District of
Columbia for its “key inquiry,”171 found that based on the evidence
before the IEP team, “it was entirely unreasonable to believe that A.T.
could receive meaningful educational benefit on the diploma track.”172
B.

Observations

It will take years for a body of new FAPE cases to advance
through the administrative and federal review processes. In fact, in the
sixteen months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew, only the
Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have decided a postEndrew substantive FAPE case.173 Scholarship analyzing the post-

165

Id. at *2.
793 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
167 888 F.3d 515, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
168 Id. at 517.
169 Id.
170
Id. at 524.
171 312 F. Supp. 3d 113, 128 (D.D.C. 2018).
172 Id. at 134.
173 The D.C. Circuit offered advice in an opinion remanding a case to the district court (Z.B.
v. D.C., 888 F.3d 515, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2018)) that was later followed by another district court
in the D.C. Circuit (Middleton, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 128).
166
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Endrew impact on FAPE cases has just begun174 and will no doubt
continue as the case law develops around the new FAPE standard.
However, we offer our observations from our review of the cases
decided to date.
Of the seventy cases we reviewed and included in the chart at
the end of this article, fifty resulted in a FAPE finding. Twenty
resulted in a NO FAPE finding. Of the fifty FAPE cases, all but nine
began with a FAPE finding at the administrative level that was
affirmed by the district court and in some cases the court of appeals for
that Circuit. Four of the nine FAPE cases began with a NO FAPE
finding but were reversed by the state review officer. One was
reversed by the federal district court for applying the incorrect FAPE
standard. One denied an injunction advising the parties to develop a
new IEP. Two were remanded for further consideration in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew. One was remanded by the U.S.
Supreme Court resulting in a FAPE finding by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
Of the twenty NO FAPE cases included in the chart, four were
reversals of a FAPE finding at the administrative level, two were
reversals of a FAPE finding at the administrative level and remanded
for a decision in light of Endrew, and one was the Endrew decision that
was remanded by the Supreme Court resulting in a NO FAPE finding
by the District of Colorado. Thirteen of the NO FAPE cases included
in the chart began with a NO FAPE finding at the administrative level
that was affirmed by the district court and in some cases the court of
appeals for that Circuit.
Consistent with the above results, in virtually all seventy
opinions we reviewed, the court mentioned or discussed at length the
importance of deference to the administrative hearing officer’s
findings. In fact, in one case the district court referred to the due
weight owed the hearing officer’s decision as “great deference.”175
Notably, in forty-nine of the cases reviewed, the parents were
seeking monetary relief from the school district. Thirty requested
tuition reimbursement for private school.
Thirteen requested

174 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Endrew F. After Six Months: A Game Changer?, 348 EDUC.
LAW REP. 585 (2017); Perry A. Zirkel, The Aftermath of Endrew F. One Year Later: An
Updated Outcomes Analysis, 352 EDUC. LAW REP. 448 (2018); Mark C. Weber, Endrew F.
and Fry Symposium, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 425 (2017).
175 S.M. v. Hendry Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 2:14-cv-237-FtM-38CM, 2017 WL 4417070, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2017).
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compensatory education. Four requested both. Two requested the
school district pay for an independent evaluation.
Regarding the language used by the courts in the various
circuits to describe their post-Endrew substantive FAPE standard, the
question remains what language will be used to quantify the new
standard now that “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits”176 has been replaced with “reasonably calculated
to enable a child to make progress in light of the child’s
circumstances.”177
In our review of the post-Endrew FAPE cases, no circuit used
the “merely more than de minimis” language rejected by the Supreme
Court in Endrew178 and several acknowledged its demise. However,
no two circuits used the exact same language or approach. Many
courts simply repeated the Endrew standard without attempting to
quantify the progress required for a FAPE. There was definitely a
focus on the circumstances or unique circumstances of the child,
although some courts substituted “potential” or “disability” for
“circumstances.” However, one district court from the Ninth Circuit
did caution that the “[s]tudent’s circumstances do not require lowering
the properly-calibrated goals for his progress.”179
Some courts described the necessary progress (or benefit)
required for a FAPE as “meaningful.” One court used the term “some
meaningful progress.”180 Some courts combined the old language with
the new language like “meaningful educational program that was
reasonably calculated to enable M.P. to make progress appropriate in
light of his circumstances”;181 or “‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the
child to receive appropriate services in light of the child’s individual
circumstances” and “services are appropriate when they are reasonably
calculated to provide a child with ‘meaningful educational
benefits.’”182
176

Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998-99
(2017).
178 Id. at 1000-01.
179 Unknown Party v. Gilbert Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV-1602614-PHX-JJT, 2017 WL
3225189, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2017).
180 Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch. v. Maez, No. 16-cv-1082 WJ/WPL, 2017 WL
3278945 at *13 (D.N.M. Aug 1, 2017).
181 Mr. P v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 757 (2d Cir. 2018).
182 Jack J. ex rel. Jennifer S. v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 17-CV-3793, 2018 WL
3397552, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2018).
177
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Several courts appeared to follow the advice of the Supreme
Court in Endrew by requiring the IEP to be appropriately ambitious183
and to include challenging objectives184 in light of the child’s
circumstances. One U.S. Magistrate Judge described the proper
substantive FAPE standard as “the educational benefit that an IEP is
designed to achieve must be ‘meaningful’ and ‘appropriately
ambitious in light of the student’s circumstances.’”185
VI.

IMPLICATIONS

In the year and a half since the Endrew decision, courts have
grappled with the implications of the Endrew ruling when adjudicating
FAPE cases. In this section we extrapolate implications from the High
Court’s ruling and subsequent court rulings to this point.
A.

Implication-The demise of the de minimis
educational benefit standard.

The responses of the Supreme Court Justices in the oral
arguments clearly revealed their skepticism of the de minimis standard.
For example, Justice Kagan remarked that the de minimis standard “is
so low, so easy to meet.”186 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg noted that the
“formulation more than de minimis sets the level [of educational
benefit] too low.”187
According to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Endrew:
When all is said and done, a student offered an
educational program providing “merely more than de
minimis” progress from year to year can hardly be said
to have been offered an education at all. For children
with disabilities receiving, instruction that aims so low
would be tantamount to “sitting idly . . . awaiting the

183

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
Id.
185 E.R. ex rel. E.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:16-CV-0058, 2017 WL
3017282, at *13 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2017).
186 Oral Argument at 32:30, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1,
137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-827.
187 Id. at 38:00.
184
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time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’” The
IDEA demands more.188
The Supreme Court’s new standard is undoubtedly higher than
the de minimis educational benefit standard. In fact, the Supreme
Court found “little significance in the Court’s language [in Rowley]
concerning the requirement that States provide instruction calculated
to ‘confer some educational benefit.’”189 The demise of the de minimis
educational benefit standard seems clear; it is doubtful that the de
minimis terminology will be used in future FAPE cases.
B.

Implication-The Supreme Court raises the
educational benefit bar.

In addition to jettisoning the de minimis educational benefit
standard, the Court clearly favored adopting a higher educational
benefit standard. In oral arguments both Justices Kagan and Ginsburg
were in favor of adopting “a standard with a bite.”190
In the Endrew opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that a
student’s “IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress. After
all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing
academic and functional advancement.”191 In fact, the Court found that
“[a] substantive standard not focused on student progress would do
little to remedy the pervasive and tragic academic stagnation that
prompted Congress to act.”192 Thus, the Court’s new standard is: “To
meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an
IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”193
In addition to the new educational progress standard, the High
Court offered guidance on how schools may develop an IEP that is
reasonably calculated to provide progress. For example, the Court
noted the importance of a full and individualized assessment of a

188

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (alteration in original).
Id. at 998.
190 Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with Proper Standard for Measuring
Educational Benefits for Children with Disabilities, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2017, 6:12PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-justices-grapple-proper-standardmeasuring-educational-benefits-children-disabilities/.
191 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
192 Id.
193 Id.
189
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student’s needs that becomes the basis of his or her IEP. According to
the High Court:
A focus on the particular child is at the core of the IDEA. The
instruction offered must be “specially designed” to meet a child’s
“unique needs” through an “[i]ndividualized education program.” An
IEP is not a form document. It is constructed only after careful
consideration of the child’s present levels of achievement, disability,
and potential for growth.194 The resulting IEP must then include
challenging, ambitious, and measurable annual goals and special
education services, related services, and program modifications that
are based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable.195
Moreover, the IEP must include a method for monitoring and
measuring student progress during the course of instruction so that
educational changes may be made if necessary.196 Appropriate training
is of utmost importance in developing teachers and administrators who
can draft IEPs that (a) are based on relevant and meaningful
assessment, (b) include ambitious measurable annual goals, and (c)
measure students’ progress using evidence-based strategies.197
According to the Supreme Court, the child’s “educational
program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his circumstances,
just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for
most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every
child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”198
C.

Implication-The importance of the right words.

Justice Sotomayor believed that “the [IDEA] provides enough
to set a clear standard.”199 She also summed up the court’s dilemma in
attempting to elevate the educational benefit standard when she
remarked that “the words are what we’re trying to . . . come to that
would be less confusing to everyone.”200
Time will tell if the emphasis on “progress appropriate in light
of the child’s circumstances”201 proves to be less confusing to the
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id.
Yell et al., supra note 23, at 83.
Id.
Id.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017).
Oral Argument, supra note 186, at 21:50.
Id.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
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courts. The words, however, have not proven to be confusing to either
the U.S. Department of Education or advocacy groups.
On December 7, 2017, the Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter “OSERS”) in the U.S. Department
of Education issued a question and answer document on the Endrew
ruling.202 Part of the mission of OSERS is to develop and disseminate
information on federal policy regarding the IDEA in the form of
guidance documents and letters. The purpose of these documents is to
provide important information to officials in state education agencies
and school districts on their obligations in implementing the IDEA.
According to the Department, the Endrew ruling was
particularly important because it “informs our efforts to improve
academic outcomes for children with disabilities.”203 Therefore, the
purpose of this particular guidance document was to provide “parents
and other stakeholders information on the issues addressed in Endrew
F. and the impact of the Court’s decision on the implementation of the
IDEA.”204
The Department’s document is divided into the following three
sections: (a) an overview that explains the facts and the ruling, (b) a
clarification of the IDEA’s FAPE requirement, and (c) the
Department’s interpretation of how the Endrew ruling can be
implemented in special education programs.205 The question and
answer document is very specific in the advice it provides to special
educators. For example, some of the questions posed and answered
include the following: Question 11 “What does ‘progress appropriate
in light of the child’s circumstances mean?” Question 12, “How can
an IEP Team ensure that every child has the chance to meet
challenging objectives?” Question 13, “How can IEP Teams
determine if IEP annual goals are appropriately ambitious?” Question
15, “What actions should IEP Teams take if a child is not making
progress at the level the IEP Team expected?”206
Similarly, an organization consisting of fifteen nonprofit parent
advocacy groups for children and youth with disabilities called

202 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Q&A) ON U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE
DECISION ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1 (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/qa-endrewcase-12-07-2017.pdf.
203 Id. at 1.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 2.
206 Id.
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Understood maintains a website for parents of children with
disabilities.207 A few months after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Endrew the website posted the downloadable “Endrew F. Advocacy
Toolkit.”208 The toolkit includes the “Endrew F. Talking Points to
Advocate for Your Child.”209 The talking points document consists of
eight points including an area that should be discussed at a child’s IEP
meeting, a quotation from the Endrew opinion that addresses that
point, another quotation from the U.S. Department of Education’s
letters of policy guidance that also addresses that point, and an
explanation of what the quotation means written in parent-friendly
language. The second document in the toolkit is the “Endrew F.
Worksheet for Strengthening Your Child’s IEP.”210 The Worksheet
consists of eight points, each of which includes the relevant talking
point, two lists that require a child’s parents to write down what they
were dissatisfied with about their child’s IEP (e.g., “List where you
feel your child’s IEP goals aren’t ambitious enough.”) and what
actions they would like to see taken by the IEP team (e.g., “What goals
would you like to see?”), and a suggested script for the parents to use
at the IEP meeting (e.g., “I know that my child’s goals should be
appropriately ambitious. Even if my child is behind in academics, the
IEP goals should aim to help my child catch up.”). The availability of
this information increases the likelihood that IEP teams will include
parents of children and youth with disabilities and advocates who are
knowledgeable about the Endrew ruling and are equipped to discuss
the decision at IEP team meetings.
The largest professional organization for teachers and
administrators in special education and for children and youth with
disabilities and their parents is the Council for Exceptional Children.211

207

UNDERSTOOD, HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTOOD.ORG/EN (LAST VISITED JAN. 30, 2019).
Endrew F. Advocacy Toolkit, UNDERSTOOD, https://www.understood.org/en/schoollearning/your-childs-rights/basics-about-childs-rights/download-endrew-f-advocacy-toolkit
(last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
209 Endrew
F. Talking Points to Advocate for Your Child, UNDERSTOOD,
https://www.understood.org/~/media/7bea7527cfb14717b42e0689ae5a57be.pdf (last visited
Jan. 30, 2019).
210 Endrew F. Worksheet for Strengthening Your Child’s IEP, UNDERSTOOD,
https://www.understood.org/~/media/1354d644263349ac930decaed20a8389.pdf (last visited
Jan. 30, 2019).
211 COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, HTTPS://WWW.CEC.SPED.ORG/ (LAST VISITED JAN.
30, 2019).
208
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The Council has undertaken an effort to inform their membership
about the Endrew decision through webinars and publications.212
Our analysis of the case law since the Endrew ruling affirms
the importance deference plays in the U.S. District Courts and U.S.
Courts of Appeals decisions. Of course, the role that deference plays
is mitigated by the facts and the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement
that “[a] reviewing court may fairly expect those [school] authorities
to be able to offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their
decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the
child to make progress appropriate in light of his circumstances.”213
D.

Implication-The importance of parental
participation in the special education process.

According to Barbara Bateman, the most basic procedural
requirement of the IDEA, is that parents must be full and equal
participants with school district personnel in the development of their
child’s special education program.214 In fact, in the 1982 Rowley
decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[W]e think that the importance Congress attached to
these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. It
seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed
every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with
procedures giving parents and guardians a large
measure of participation at every stage of the
administrative process . . . as it did upon the
measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive
standard.215
Similarly, in the Endrew ruling, the Supreme Court noted that
a child’s “IEP must be drafted in compliance with a detailed set of
procedures . . . [that] emphasize collaboration among parents and
educators.”216 Additionally, in Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.,217
212

Id.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1002 (2017).
214
Barbara D. Bateman, Individual Education Programs for Children with Disabilities, in
HANDBOOK OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 87, 88 (James M. Kauffman et al. eds., 2012).
215 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 205, 205-06
(1982).
216 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994.
217 550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007).
213
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the High Court held that a student’s parents can prosecute their own
IDEA claims in federal court pro se because the “IDEA grants parents
independent, enforceable rights” including not only rights related to
certain procedural and reimbursement matters but also the “entitlement
to a free appropriate public education” for their child.218 Moreover,
according to the IDEA, procedural violations committed by school
district personnel may lead to a ruling that FAPE was denied when the
procedural violations “significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity
to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of
a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child.”219
Seemingly, the IDEA and these special education rulings from the
Supreme Court put parents and school district personnel on a level
playing field.
In practice, however, the existence of a level playing field
between parents and school district personnel is uncertain. In 2005,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Schaffer v. Weast220 ruled that when parents
challenge their child’s FAPE, because they are the party seeking relief,
they bear the burden of proof.221 Thus, parents must have more
evidence on their side to prevail and they will lose even in situations
in which the evidence presented by both sides is essentially equal.
Because school districts have more funds to spend on experts and
experienced attorneys, this decision seems to tilt the playing field in
favor of the school district. In 2006, the playing field became even
less level when the Supreme Court, in Arlington Central School
District Board of Education v. Murphy, ruled that even in situations in
which parents prevail in IDEA cases, they are not entitled to be
reimbursed for fees spent on expert witnesses.222 In his dissent, Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Stevens, noted that Congress had
intended to include expert witness fees as recoverable costs as
indicated in the conference committee report.223 Justice Breyer argued
that parents’ “rights and procedural protections may be seriously
diminished if parents are unable to obtain reimbursement for the costs
of their experts.”224 Justice Breyer also noted that requiring parents to
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Id.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II) (2018).
546 U.S. 49 (2005).
Id. at 51.
548 U.S. 291, 304 (2006).
Id. at 309 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 313-14.
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bear the costs of their own experts is “a far cry from the level playing
field that Congress envisioned.”225
Claire Raj and Emily Suski wrote on the burden of these two
rulings:
This burden is felt most keenly by parents of limited
financial means who are unable to pay for experts and
attorneys who would help them carry this weight and
serve as a true check on a school’s duty to provide a
FAPE that enables their child “to make progress
appropriate in light of [his or her] circumstances.”226
Raj and Suski also suggested that when Congress revisits the IDEA,
because school districts have an affirmative duty to provide a FAPE,
the law should be amended to shift the burden of proof from parents to
school district officials.227 Similarly, allowing the recovery of expert
witness fees would help to level the playing field, as the IDEA Fairness
Restoration Act bill attempted to do in 2011.228 This effort, which was
introduced in the House by then Congressman Chris Van Hollen and
in the Senate229 by then Senator Thomas Harkin, did not become law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the de minimis or trivial view of educational
benefit has been overturned in Endrew. To ensure adherence to the
new educational benefit standard, students’ IEPs must be based on
relevant, meaningful, and individualized assessments of their needs.
Additionally, students’ annual IEP goals should be challenging,
appropriately ambitious, and measurable. Finally, students’ progress
toward their annual goals should be monitored using databased
measurement systems. When determining whether a school district
has met the educational benefit standard of Endrew, and provided a
student with FAPE, hearing officers and judges will need to determine
if an IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the student to make
225

Id. at 316.
Claire Raj & Emily Suski, Endrew F.’s Unintended Consequences, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 499,
525 (2017) (alteration in original).
227 Id. at 524.
228 H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/
house-bill/1208. See also Raj & Suski, supra note 226, at 524.
229 S. 613, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/sen
ate-bill/613.
226
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progress appropriate in light of his or her circumstances. It will take
time and future decisions to determine exactly how courts will interpret
the Endrew standard. It would appear, nonetheless, that the Endrew
ruling was a victory for students with disabilities and their parents.
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